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MYSTICISM, VERIDICALITY, AND MODALITY
Robert Oakes
A 37 year old housewife told a Gallup interviewer, "It's indescribable,
except that all of a sudden you have no more doubts that there is a
God-no more questions-you just know!"
The Milwaukee Journal, December 11, 1976

It may well be that nothing constitutes hallowed ground for statisticians-not
even hallowed ground. In any case, it seems incontestable that 'data' developed
from Gallup polls-albeit of considerable sociological (and psychological)
interest-has negligible relevance for attempts to adjudicate the time-honored
philosophical issue of the epistemic force of 'religious experience'. This notwithstanding, our opening excerpt has inspired me to imagine that I have a very
special friend-so special a friend that I can think of nothing more fitting to call
her than 'SF'. Now among the many distinctive and endearing attributes of SF
is that of being a theistic mystic. While she is very pleased about this, SF finds
(so she has told me in confidence) that being a theistic mystic can occasionally
be socially wearisome. That is, her many skeptical friends-not lacking in epistemological adroitness---Dften try to disturb her metaphysical serenity by invoking
a long-standing and ostensibly plausible challenge to theistic mysticism: specifically, they are wont to insist that, lacking some reliable criterion for discriminating veridical religious experience from the illusive variety, SF has no
legitimate way of being certain that her 'apprehensions of God's presence' are
veridical rather than illusive.
With characteristic pertinacity, however, SF responds by appealing to an
epistemological doctrine which occupies a venerable place within the tradition
of theistic mysticism. I Specifically, and with a philosophical sophistication that
has eluded many a theistic mystic, she responds as follows:
The experiences in question are of such a nature that I do not require
any criterion to be certain that they are veridical. 2 Rather, I have noncritical certainty that such is the case. Alternatively, that my relevant
experiences constitute veridical apprehensions of God's presence is
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immediately apparent to me since the experiences in question have the very
special epistemic status of being self-authenticating, i.e., of guaranteeing
their own veridicality to their epistemic subjects. Accordingly, every such
experience provides me with infallible justification for believing that it constitutes a veridical awareness of God's presence.

Needless to say that SF's skeptical friends (I am not one of them) regard this
response as patently unacceptable. The only impact it has upon them is to arouse
their epistemological ire to a level which may not be compatible with good
mental health. Predictably, their counter-rejoinder proceeds along the following
lines:
Clearly, no experience3-whether 'religious' or not~ould conceivably
authenticate itself to its epistemic subject, i.e., provide the latter with
a guarantee of its veridicality. Rather, since no experience (even those
which are in fact veridical) could enjoy logical immunity from being
illusive, no veridical experience could be such that its veridicality was
immediately apparent to its epistemic subject. Alternatively, for any
experience e with the property of being veridical, that e is veridical
could never be a truth which (in Chisholm's terms) 'presents itself' to
its epistemic subject. Accordingly, without some (workable) criterion
for discriminating veridical religious experiences from illusive ones, no
one is entitled to be positive that his/her putative experiences of God's
presence are in fact veridical. Hence, you are not entitled to be sure
that your putative experiences of God's presence are in fact veridical.
'Oh yes I am', retorts SF-and thus the dialectic escalates, with not the slightest
(chance for any) meeting of minds.
It seems clear that the foregoing encapsulates a long-standing and central
disagreement between 'mystics'>and their critics. Now while much has been
said and gainsaid about 'self-authenticating religious experience', I suggest that
it remains an issue about which there is considerably more confusion than clarity,
and, accordingly, about which lots more needs to be said. First of all, it seems
to me that there is yet to be provided anything like a satisfactory explication of
the issue. Alternatively, just how are we to understand the doctrine that there
can occur experiences of God's presence with the very special epistemic property
of being self-authenticating? Since nothing is more central to the epistemology
of religious experience than the question of veridicality and just how it is to be
adjudicated, arriving at a proper understanding of the self-authentication doctrine
is of the first importance.
I have argued elsewhere5-and remain convinced-that the concept of modal
veridicality (discussed at length in the sequel) is absolutely indispensable to an
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adequate grasp, let alone a satisfactory resolution, of the issue in question. In
sum, I intend to show that the concept of modal (or essential) veridicality constitutes nothing less than the key to the entire matter. In so doing, I shall flesh
out and add lots of needed muscle to the 'prolegomenon' developed in my
previous paper on this topic. Moreover, I shall formulate and defend a line of
argument which played no role whatever in my former paper, and whichassuming its success--can readily be seen to strengthen the mystic's position in
no small way. While this line of argument falls short of establishing that SF and
company should be regarded as decisively victorious on the self-authentication
issue, it does establish a considerably less modest thesis than that defended in
my previous paper.
Briefly, the purpose of my 'prolegomenon' was to establish that, while selfauthenticating religious experience may be inconceivable, it is far from obvious
(in contradistinction to what remains the strident contention of the critics) that
such is the case. However, if my argumentation to follow is successful, what
will have been established is the stronger or more significant thesis that the
occurrence of self-authenticating religious experience gives substantial indication
of being a perfectly conceivable state of affairs, 6 i.e., entails nothing that is
repugnant to the intellect. Moreover, and of greater significance yet, the intriguing
and perhaps surprising conclusion to emerge from our subsequent deliberations
is that, insofar as the most spiritually profound sort of theistic religious experience
is concemed-i.e., 'spiritual-union-with-God' (hereafter just 'spiritual-union')there is powerful warrant for denying the conceivability of there occurring an
experience of that sort that is both veridical and non-self-authenticating.
II

I take it to be evident that a (logically) necessary condition of an experience's
being self-authenticating is not simply that" it be veridical, but-much more
strongly-that there be no possible world at which precisely that experience
(occurs and) is nonveridical. Consider a veridical experience e with person N as
its epistemic subject: now if e-albeit in fact veridical--<:ould conceivably have
been illusive, it is thereby conceivable that N-though in fact she is not-should
have been mistaken in believing e to be veridical. Given that, however, it hardly
seems proper to regard e as providing N with a guarantee of its veridicality,
i.e., with infallible justification for belief in its veridicality. Accordingly, to
express the relevant point in the vocabulary of modality de re, since any experience that could not conceivably have been illusive would be veridical essentially
(necessarily) rather than accidentally (contingently), a veridical experience would
have to be veridical essentially in order to be self-authenticating. Thus, not only
is illusive experience (obviously) disqualified from being self-authenticating,"
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but no veridical experience that could have been illusive would enjoy that distinction. Hence, only if there could occur veridical experience of God's presence
to which veridicality was essential could there occur veridical experience of
God's presence that was self-authenticating.
Now I take it to be clear that any case of veridical sensory experience is such
that veridicality is accidental to it. That is, for any sense-experience with the
property of being veridical, it is conceivable that precisely that experience should
have been illusive. Consider: at the present moment, I have no doubt whatever
that I am seeing a telephone on my desk. Granted, however, that the 'telephoneexperience' I presently am having is veridical, I should think it undeniable that
the phenomenological configuration of my veridical telephone-experience is in
every respect replicable by an illusive telephone-experience (perhaps under hypnosis, during extreme fatigue, drug ingestion, etc.). Accordingly, since my
veridical telephone-experience is-in this regard-paradigmatic of veridical sensory experience in general, it seems clear that the modal property being conceivably illusive is one which it shares with all veridical sensory experience. However,
since veridical experience that could conceivably have been illusive is, ipso
facto, veridical experience to which veridicality is accidental, it seems clear that
no veridical sense-experience could have the property of being veridical essentially. Rather, the property of veridicality must be8 accidental to any sense-experience exemplifying it. Accordingly, what is essential to all sense-experience is
the conditional property if veridical then veridical accidentally. Hence, it seems
clear that there could not occur veridical sensory experience to which veridicality
was essential.
Could there, however, occur veridical religious9 experience (veridical experience of God's presence) to which veridicality was essential? I propose that there
is very solid justification for taking the answer to this question-and perhaps
only this question-as constituting the answer to the question of whether there
could occur veridical experience of God's presence that was self-authenticating,
i.e., veridical experience of God's presence that would, by itself, guarantee its
veridicality to its epistemic subject. How so? After all, while it seems transparent--as discussed above-that an experience's being veridical essentially constitutes a necessary condition for (is entailed by) its being self-authenticating, it
seems far from transparent that essential veridicality constitutes the only necessary
condition for self-authentication, i.e., that an experience's being veridical essentially is also sufficient for (or entails) its being self-authenticating. Rather, this
needs to be argued. Accordingly, let us tum to what I take to be a convincing-if
not entirely unimpeachable-argument on behalf of the contention that veridicality constitutes a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for self-authentication (and thus for concluding that being veridical essentially and being selfauthenticating are logically equivalent properties). The success of this argument
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would, of course, legitimize our paraphrasing the question of whether there could
occur self-authenticating experience of God's presence into the question of
whether there could occur veridical experience of God's presence to which
veridicality was essential. Upon achieving that step, however, I suggest that we
will have the very solid prologue to a winning argument in defense of the
conceivability of self-authenticating religious experience. Accordingly, I shall
go on to conclude that there is impressively little basis for the time-honored and
cavalier dismissal of the mystics' claim to such experience.
III

Necessarily, veridical experience that is veridical accidentally (such as veridical
sensory experience) fails to be self-authenticating, and the reason for this is not
in the least obscure. That is, since every such veridical experience could conceivably have lacked the property of veridicality, it could never be the case that the
veridicality which is in fact exemplified by any accidentally-veridical experience
was simply a function of its qualitative character. Rather, it is necessarily the
case that factors (e.g., corroborative testimony) other than-and completely
independent of-the qualitative or phenomenological character of any such
experience would be evidentially relevant to an adjudication of its veridicality
by its epistemic subject. Accordingly, regardless of how much we may be
prone-as we so often are-to rely solely on the qualitative nature of our 'ordinary' experience as justification for belief in its veridicality, the point to be
driven home is this: since the qualitative nature of any accidentally-veridical
experience is compatible with its being nonveridical-since precisely that experience could have been illusive-there never could occur an accidentally-veridical
experience such that its qualitative nature alone provided its epistemic subject
with absolutely definitive or infallible justification for belief in its veridicality.
Hence, it can properly be concluded that the non-self-authenticating status of
'ordinary' veridical experience is attributable to its being conceivably nonveridical. Alternatively, a veridical experience's being veridical accidentally is all
that it takes for it to lack the property of being self-authenticating.
Suppose, however, that there could occur veridical experience to which veridicality was essential? What I believe is demonstrable is that there is considerably
more than ample justification for viewing any such experience as self-authenticating. How so? Well, for any experience to which veridicality was essential, the
precise qualitative nature of that experience would be incompatible with-would
preclude-its being illusive, i.e., there is no possible world at which there occurs
an experience that is (or could have been) nonveridical but shares the precise
qualitative nature of some veridical experience that was veridical essentially.
Since that is so, however, what additional to the qualitative nature or
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phenomenological content of any essentially-veridical experience could ever be
required by its epistemic subject in order to secure her entitlement to be sure of
its veridicality? Alternatively, the phenomenological content of any essentiallyveridical experience would seem to be all that it takes to provide its epistemic
subject with definitive or infallible justification for belief in its veridicality. If
that is so, of course, then any essentially-veridical experience would have the
very special epistemic property of authenticating itself to its epistemic subject.
I suggest that this point can both be sharpened and strengthened as follows:
any veridical experience to which veridicality was essential would be an experience the veridicality of which was among those properties (or their exemplifications) that made up--composed-its qualitative nature. Alternatively, since it is
impossible for any experience that was actually or conceivably nonveridical to
be such that its phenomenological content was precisely identical to that of any
veridical experience that was veridical essentially, it is evident that veridicality
would be among those properties that compose the phenomenological content of
any essentially-veridical experience. However, for any given experience, its
phenomenological content gives every indication of being such that the awareness
which its epistemic subject has of it is all-inclusive. Specifically, for any person
P and experience e that is had by P, there is considerably more than ample basis
for holding that P cannot but apprehend every property that is a component of
e's phenomenological content, i.e., for holding that every such property
announces itself to P. We need only consider, for example, the transparent
perversity of claims such as 'Redness and luminosity are among those properties
that compose the phenomenological content of the experience had by John at t,
but John fails to apprehend redness at t.'
Accordingly, the phenomenological content of any experience would seem to
be such that its epistemic subject's awareness of it differs dramatically in (what
might be termed) 'epistemic breadth' from the sort of awareness that one normally
has of external objects/events (recognizing, of course, that the major segment
of our experiences surely seem to be of external objects/events, thereby
exemplifying a 'referential' or 'extrapsychological' aspect). For our awareness
of external objects is rarely all-inclusive. Our usual perceptions of cars and
kitchen tables, for example, rarely involves our being aware of all of their
empirically ascertainable features, e.g., every mark and stain on their surfaces.
This does not, of course, rule out cases wherein one's awareness of some external
object is all-inclusive. Rather, it is simply to drive home the point that, in
contradistinction to what is characteristic of our apprehension of perceptual data
as such, all-inclusive or 'comprehensive' awareness of some external object is
in no way a function of its epistemic subject's being aware of that object at all.
Accordingly, there is very solid foundation for concluding that the epistemic
subject of any experience the phenomenological content of which had veridicality
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as a component-i.e., any experience to which veridicality was essential-would
be immediately aware of its veridicality. Alternatively, for any veridical experience e to which veridicality was essential, that e is veridical gives every indication
of being a proposition the truth of which is guaranteed to e's epistemic subject
solely by virtue of e's phenomenological content. Hence, there would seem to
be considerably more than ample justification for viewing any veridical experience
to which veridicality was essential as-ipso facto-a veridical experience that
was self-authenticating.
One can, however, raise a plausible objection to the foregoing argument-an
objection that is largely a priori in character, and, accordingly, that can be held
to vitiate any argument for the claim that an experience's being veridical essentially entails its being self-authenticating. 10 Specifically, it can be contended that
veridicality-as a property that applies only to experiences-is, strictly speaking,
an ontological (rather than an epistemological) property. Moreover, it seems
eminently plausible that ontological properties have no epistemic entailments.
In any case, it seems incontestable that an experience's being veridical is perfectly
compatible with its epistemic subject's failing to know that it is. (For example,
the relevant person-perhaps as a consequence of the unusual character of the
experience or some other respectable reason-may either believe that his or her
experience is illusive or adopt a skeptical attitude about its veridicality). Accordingly, an experience's being veridical essentially is perfectly compatible with its
epistemic subject's failing to know that it is-i.e., failing to know that it is
veridical at all, and thus (a fortiori) failing to know that it is veridical in such
a way as to preclude the conceivability of its being illusive. For veridicality does
not magically become an epistemological property~r one with epistemic entailments-in those cases (should there be any) wherein some experience exemplifies
it essentially rather than accidentally. Hence, an experience's being veridical
essentially is perfectly compatible with its epistemic subject's failing to have
immediate awareness of its veridicality. Accordingly, it would seem that an
experience's being veridical essentially does not entail its being self-authenticating.
It seems to me that the preceding line of reasoning has considerable merit.
However, I think it can readily be seen not to impair the thesis that an experience's
being veridical essentially entails its being self-authenticating. For the occurrence
of an essentially-veridical experience that was not known to be veridical by its
epistemic subject (a fortiori not known by its epistemic subject to be veridical
essentially) is perfectly compatible with its being true that essential-veridicality
entails self-authentication. That is, while it could not fail to be the case that any
self-authenticating experience would guarantee its veridicality to its epistemic
subject, it must be emphasized that the relevant 'guarantee' has to be construedstrictly speaking-not as categorical but as conditional in character. For since
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being-certain-that-p entails (as the strongest version of) knowing-that-p, which,
in tum, entails believing-that-p, the 'guarantee' in question presupposes the
epistemic subject's belief in the veridicality of the relevant essentially-veridical
experience. However, since human beings are not ideally rational beings, there
can be (and assuredly have been and will be) cases wherein some of us fail to
assent to the epistemically indubitable. Accordingly, it must be allowed that the
(conjunctive) state of affairs consisting in an experience's being veridical essentially and its epistemic subject's failing to know that it is veridical (let alone
veridical essentially) is not self-contradictory. Hence, I propose the following
contextual definition of 'self-authenticating' in terms of the intentional and epistemic notions of belief and certainty:

A veridical experience e that occurs to some person N is self-authenticating iff it is inconceivable both that N should (i) believe-strictly
on the basis of e's phenomenological content-that e is veridical and
(ii) fail to be certain of its veridicality, i.e., if N believes-(once again)
strictly on the basis of e' s phenomenological content-that e is veridical,
such belief would be logically sufficient for (would entail) N's being
absolutely certain of e's veridicality.
Consequently, if our preceding argument (for viewing any essentially-veridical
experience as-ipso facto-self-authenticating) is sound, there is substantial
warrant for holding that any veridical experience to which veridicality was essential would satisfy the definiens of the foregoing definition.
Now it seems clear that-granted the success of our analysis heretofore-there
remains a rugged road to hoe before we can properly claim to have made any
significant inroads on behalf of the doctrine represented and defended by SF.
For her many skeptical friends can agree with all that has been argued thus
far--i.e., can agree that there is very strong justification for regarding an experience's being veridical essentially as all that it takes for it to be self-authenticating-and still remain as recalcitrant as ever concerning their negative verdict
on the conceivability of self-authenticating religious experience. Specifically,
the skeptics can hold-and can plausibly be expected to hold-that (necessarily)
all veridical experience (whether sensory or not) has at least this much in common
with my veridical 'telephone-experience' discussed above: veridicality is accidental to it. Thus, the skeptics can hold to the conceptual impossibility of there
occurring veridical experience of any kind (accordingly, veridical experience of
God's presence) that could not conceivably have lacked the property of veridicality. Hence, they can be expected to contend that what is essential to each and
every experience is the conditional property if veridical then veridical accidentally.
However, I suggest that we are now prepared to establish that the occurrence
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of essentially-veridical experience of God's presence is perfectly conceivable,
and, accordingly, for rejecting the skeptical view that, necessarily, all veridical
experience is veridical accidentally.

IV
Initially, there might be the temptation to endorse an argument along the
following lines: since the theistic conception of divinity entails that experience
of God's presence is inherently revelatoryJ '-i.e. , since there could be no veridical
experience of that sort which failed to constitute a divine 'disclosure'-the
omnipotence of God (if God exists) suffices to ensure His ability to bring about
veridical experience of His presence to which veridicality was essential. Alternatively, God's omnipotence includes the power to bring about veridical experiences
of His presence the precise qualitative nature of which could not be replicated
in all respects by any nonveridical experience 'of His presence'. While it seems
to me that this argument is very far from wrong-headed, and, moreover, constitutes an embryonic and very rough version of a successful argument on behalf
of the conceivability of essentially-veridical religious experience, there would
seem to be eminently good reason for rejecting it as it stands.
Specifically, the skeptic can readily and plausibly respond by asserting that,
in the absence of compelling justification for believing otherwise, it is proper
to maintain that there could not occur a veridical religious experience with
phenomenological content that was not in every respect replicable by an illusive
'religious experience'. Alternatively, for any object 0 of possible experience,
why believe that there can occur veridical experiences of 0 the phenomenological
configurations of which are unique to veridical experience of O? Accordingly,
why believe that there could occur veridical experience of God's presence with
phenomenological configurations that were not replicable-in-all-respects by some
illusive' experience of God's presence'? Rather, and notwithstanding the omnipotence of God, it is proper to maintain that it would not be within His power to
bring about veridical experience of His presence to which veridicality was essential. Call this the Phenomenological Replication Argument (PRA).
It seems to me that the PRA deserves to be taken very seriously. That is, I
think that in the absence of compelling justification for believing otherwise, it
is proper to deny that there could occur veridical experience of God's presence
to which veridicality was essential. However, what I hope to establish in the
sequel is that-to the fatal misfortune of the PRA-there is compelling justification for believing othenvise. Before proceeding to adduce such justification,
however, let it be clear that I shall make no attempt to produce what I take to
be inherently unproducible-namely, a rigorous or definitive analysis of what
would be central to the phenomenological content of veridical religious experi-
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ence. Indeed, it would seem to be incontestable that phenomenological properties
as such-not simply those indigenous to veridical experience of God's presencecould not but contain some unanalyzable or conceptually inexpressible components. 12 Moreover, this seems especially evident insofar as the phenomenological
properties that compose feeling-states are concerned, and it seems abundantly
clear that mystical states of consciousness-notwithstanding their 'noetic' component-are closer in character and texture to states of feeling than to states of
cognition. 13 Accordingly, I suggest that the mystics' traditional insistence upon
the ineffability of religious experience-particularly of the incomparably profound
experience of 'spiritual-union'--deserves to be treated with considerably more
respect than has traditionally come its way from analytic philosophers.
This being said, however, I hope to establish that what is analyzable about
the concept of veridical religious experience-specifically of veridical spiritualunion experience-yields us compelling justification for concluding not simply
that the occurrence of essentially-veridical experience of that sort is perfectly
conceivable (and thus that the PRA is unsound), but, more strongly, that the
occurrence of veridical spiritual-union experience to which veridicality is nonessential is inconceivable. Accordingly, what emerges from our deliberations is
that there is powerful warrant for concluding not only that it is conceivable for
there to occur self-authenticating spiritual-union experience, but, more strongly
and more intriguingly, that it is inconceivable for there to occur veridical spiritualunion experience that failed to be self-authenticating.

v
At the very heart of the effort to secure our thesis is the need to devote some
close attention to a relational property that, if theists are correct, is exemplified
by contingent-i.e., generable and perishabl~bjects in both the distributive
and collective senses: namely, is exemplified by any single contingent object
and by the aggregate of contingent objects that constitute what we call 'the
cosmos'. The property of which I speak is being-God-produced-and-God-conserved. 14 Our specific purpose in this section is to adduce compelling justification
for maintaining that this property could not fail to be essential to any contingent
object that exemplified it. The major significance of this for the success of our
thesis will become clear in the subsequent and closing section.
Exactly what, however, mandates the conclusion that being-God-producedand-God-conserved could not fail to be essential to any contingent object that
exemplified it? Consider: if-as is held by theism-the final or foundational
principle of explanation for the coming-into-being and continuance-in-being of
contingent objects can only be found in the exercise of (respectively) God's
productive and conserving powers, it seems unimpeachable that the property in
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question is possessed by contingent objects simply because of their ontological
contingency. Perhaps more perspicuously, contingent objects could properly be
said to exemplify this property because-in contradistinction to self-existent
objects such as, e.g., numbers and properties (though I recognize the controversy
here)- no contingent object is such that its inherent or essential nature dictates
its existence. Accordingly, if contingent objects have the property of being-Godproduced-and-God-conserved, that they do so seems undeniably attributable to
their requiring-ultimately if not proximately-the productive and conserving
activities of God for (respectively) their coming-into-being and perdurance. Alternatively, the exercise of God's productive and conserving powers would be what
it takes to ensure the initial and ongoing existence of contingent objects.
However, if the exercise of such divine powers is really (as theists, of course,
urge) what it takes for the actualization of 'contingent being', then whatever is
a contingent object is ipso facto God-produced-and-God-conserved-i.e., any
contingent object's being God-produced-and-God-conserved would constitute a
function of its being-a-contingent-object. Alternatively, any contingent object
would exemplify the former property solely by virtue of exemplifying the latter.
This being so, however, it is clear that there could exist a contingent object that
was God-produced-and-God-conserved nonessentially only if there could exist
a contingent object that was a contingent object nonessentially. Accordingly, all
that is needed to warrant a rejection of the view that there could be contingent
objects that exemplified being-God-produced-and-God-conserved accidentally
is decisive justification for rejecting the view that there could be contingent
objects that exemplified being-a-contingent-object accidentally.
Could there not, however, be contingent objects to which the property of
being-a-contingent-object was accidental? Surely not. For the claim that there
could exist contingent objects that were contingent objects accidentally-i.e.,
contingent objects that could have (existed and)failed to be contingent objectshas modal entailments that are patently unpalatable to reason. Specifically, that
there could exist contingent objects that in some possible world or other exist
as non-contingent objects entails that there is at least one possible world at which
there exists, e.g., a polar bear, or a star, or a mountain-indeed, any contingent
object that you please-that is strictly identical to an object which exists at some
other possible world as God or as (an abstract object such as) a number, property,
state of affairs, or proposition. However, if this is not paradigmatic of an intuitively or self-evidently unacceptable modal scenario, I am unable to understand
what would constitute such a paradigm. Accordingly, its repugnance to the
intellect dictates our rejection of the view that there could exist contingent objects
to which being-a-contingent-object was accidental.
So: since this is precisely what is required to warrant a rejection of the view
that there could exist contingent objects to which being-God-produced-and-God-
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conserved was accidental, the proper conclusion to be drawn is that there could
not exist contingent objects to which that property was accidental. Let it be clear
that this does not constitute an affirmative begging of the question of God's
existence since it does not entail that there are any contingent objects with the
property of being-God-produced-and-God-conserved. Rather, that there is compelling justification for denying the possibility of contingent objects to which
that property was accidental is-taken alone-perfectly compatible with the view
that such a property is not exemplified by contingent objects at all.
Hence, the question which remains to be addressed is this: exactly what is the
significance of all this for the success of our thesis?
VI

I take the following passage from Thomas Merton to be of central importance
for what is to be established in this concluding section:
... true contemplation is the experience of an immediate spiritual union
with God, a union which can only be effected by God and which is
essentially a union of supernatural charity ... no spirit other than God
Himself can unite himself immediately to the soul, and no one but God
can infuse supernatural charity into the soul. .. no spirit less than the
Spirit of God can possibly produce even plausible imitation of mystical
union ... anyone who has experienced true mystical union can see at once
the infinite distance that lies between it and the false article ... 15
In the foregoing, Fr. Merton reminds us of the significant axiom that has been
emphasized by every major theistic mystic: 16 namely, that (necessarily) veridical
spiritual-union experience-i.e., what Merton terms 'true mystical union'--constitutes a divine bestowal. While we can refine our 'receptive faculties' to allow
more of the 'divine light' to 'illuminate' the soul,17 finite (hence human) persons
lack the power to effect true mystical union. Rather, no limited self could conceivably have the power to bring about spiritual union with the Supreme Self,
... a union that is so purely and perfectly natural that no created nature
could possibly bring it about. 18

In further elaboration of this point, Merton goes on to note:
Both Saint John of the Cross and Saint Thomas clearly distinguish
between acquired wisdom, which is the fruit of man's own study and
of his thought, and infused wisdom or contemplation, which is a gift
from God ... Man's "knowledge and ability"-acquired wisdom--can do
nothing to bring a man to" ... Union with God. "19
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Consider Merton's contention (in the opening quote) that' ... no spirit less than
the spirit of God can possibly produce even a plausible imitation of mystical
union' (italics mine). 1 suggest that we are now positioned to establish the
following: quite independently of whether Merton-and the mystical tradition
in general- is right is maintaining that nothing short of God, e.g., our own
imaginations, or, for that matter, malicious demons, could possibly be the source
of even a plausible imitation of veridical spiritual-union, such a doctrine is
extraordinarily close to the sober truth. Specifically, what can now be established
is that no nonveridical experience of 'spiritual-union' ,-i.e., no putative spiritualunion experience that was not effected by God--could possibly constitute a
perfect imitation of veridical spiritual-union, and, accordingly, that (necessarily)
any veridical spiritual-union experience would be veridical essentially.
To begin with, since it is necessarily true that any case of veridical spiritualunion constitutes an occurrence that can only be effected by God, it is clear that:
Necessarily, for any putative spiritual-union experience e, if e is veridical, e is God-produced-and-God-conserved.
Conversely, however, since it is no less evident that there could not occur a
God-produced-and-God-conserved spiritual-union experience that was illusive,
it is also clear that:
Necessarily, for any putative spiritual-union experience e, if e is Godproduced-and-God-conserved, e is veridical. 20
Alternatively, a spiritual-union experience's being veridical is necessary as well
as sufficient for its being God-produced-and-God-conserved. Accordingly, and
(I think) intriguingly, being-a-veridical-spiritual-union-experience and being-aGod-produced-and-God-conserved-spiritual-union-experience are logically equivalent properties, i.e., entail each other.
As we have seen, however, any contingent object with the property of beingGod-produced-and-God-conserved could not fail to exemplify that property essentially. Hence, this would also be the case for any contingent phenomenological
object with that property, e.g., any experience of spiritual-union. However, since
a spiritual-union experience's being veridical (in addition to entailing) is entailed
by its being-God-produced-and-God-conserved-is entailed by its possession of
a property that can only be had essentially-no spiritual-union experience that
was God-produced-and-God-conserved could fail to be veridical essentially.
(Clearly, just as no contingent truths are entailments of necessary truths, the de
re correlate of this unimpeachable de dicto modal axiom is that, for any object
o and property p, 0 has p essentially if (1) there is some property q that 0 has
essentially, and (2) that 0 has q entails that 0 has p.) Accordingly, the inexorable

Robert Oakes

230

conclusion to which we have been led is that there could not conceivably occur
a veridical spiritual-union experience that failed to be an essentially-veridical
spiritual-union experience. Thus, any veridical spiritual-union experience would
have the distinction of being such that its phenomenological content could not
conceivably be replicated-in-every-respect by any illusive spiritual-union experience.
Before finalizing, however, an important excursus is required: we need to
consider a plausible objection2! to the principle-absolutely central to our thesisthat a spiritual-union experience's being veridical is necessary as well as sufficient
for its being-God-produced-and-God-conserved. It proceeds as follows: If (God
exists an d)-as theism maintains--everything contingent is God-produced-andGod-conserved, then, since nonveridical spiritual-union experience is no less
contingent than would be the veridical variety, it follows that experiences of the
fonner sort would also be God-produced-and-God-conserved (and, of course,
like everything else with that property, would exemplify it essentially). Hence,
a spiritual-union experience's being-God-produced-and-God-conserved does not
entail its being veridical. Afortiori, it does not entail its being veridical essentially.
I suggest that we can accommodate this objection by invoking a venerable
metaphysical distinction-namely, that between substances and modes. This
distinction-while not without some rough edges-has what I think is considerable intuitive appeal and the support of numerous influential metaphysicians
throughout history. In Book II, Chapter 12 of his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, John Locke observes:
... the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are
taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves ... (Para. 6).
As for modes:

... modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain
not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of, substances ... (Para. 4).
Clearly, the core component of the substance-mode distinction, as formulated
and defended by Locke and its many proponents is that the existence of such
items as experiences, decisions, high-blood pressure and diabetes conditions
presuppose (conceptually) the existence of a 'substance' or 'logical subject' to
whom they apply or occur. In short, substances are 'metaphysically prior' to
modes. Hence, since experiences lack the capacity for 'subsisting by themselves,'
but rather are modes (or affections) of sentient beings-hence persons-beings
of this latter sort constitute the 'logical subjects' of such modes.
Granted that this is so, however, precisely how does it constitute a foundation
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for coping with the objection in question? Well, while theism entails that God
produces and conserves all (contingent) substances 'as a matter of course', it
does not entail that God produces and conserves all modes of substances 'as a
matter of course', particularly when the modes in question are the experiences
had by those 'substances' that constitute human persons. More strongly, an
entailment of theism can readily be seen to be that God does not produce and
conserve all of the experiences that occur to human persons. Consider: the
doctrine of human moral agency occupies a venerable place in the theistic view
of the world. Accordingly, it is central to theism that at least some human
behavior is produced and conserved by humans. For if God were the productive
and conserving cause of all human (decision and) action, then we could hardly
be said to constitute moral agents. Rather, it would then be the case that God
would be the moral agent responsible for 'our' (decisions and) actions. Hence,
a doctrine which is central to theism (human moral agency) entails that some of
our 'modes' -paradigmatic ally , those which constitute our (decisions and)
actions-are such that we alone are their producers and conservers. Thus, while
God-as the producer and conserver of all substances-is the producer and
conserver of all persons, He is not the producer and conserver of all modes of
persons.
Granted that the foregoing is sound, however, exactly how does it warrant
the conclusion that God is not the producer and conserver of all experiences had
by persons? As follows: what experiences we have is often a decisional matter,
i. e., many of our experiences are a function of the decisions that we make. 22 For
example, if N decides to rob a bank, he thereby provides himself with a number
of experiences that he would not have had otherwise---e.g., holding a gun on
people, seeing a terrified teller, laying his hands on an extraordinary amount of
cash, and, presumably, the 'introspective' experience of anxiety brought about
by his participation in a serious crime. Hence, one of the clear implications of
theism-by virtue of its commitment to the doctrine of human moral agency-is
that many of the experiences that occur to persons are brought about and conserved
by those persons, i.e., God is not the producer and conserver of all human
experiences any more than He is the producer and conserver of all human
(decisions and) actions.
Given, then, that one of the propositions denied by a theistic view of the world
is that all of the experiences that occur (can occur) to persons are (would be)
God-produced-and-God-conserved, I think it can properly be concluded that no
non veridical spiritual-union experience could have God as its productive and
conserving cause. Let it be clear, however, that this is not to suggest anything
so odd as the occurrence of any such experience would invariably be explainable
as the result of some decision on the part of its epistemic subject. 23 While the
purpose of the foregoing was to establish that the doctrine of human moral agency
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yields us compelling foundation for concluding that not all human experiences
are to be included among those contingent items that are (if theism is true)
God-produced-and-God-conserved, this does not preclude the occurrence of
human experiences that would fail to be God-produced-and-God-conserved for
reasons that are completely independent of human decision. And what I think
can readily be established is that such must be the case for any nonveridical
spiritual-union experience. Alternatively, what I believe can be shown is that
there could not conceivably occur nonveridical spiritual-union experience that
was God-produced-and-God-conserved, and, accordingly, that it is demonstratively as well as intuitively correct to maintain that a spiritual-union experience's
being-God-produced-and-God conserved entails its being veridical.
The relatively simple argument I have in mind is rooted in something very
much like the Cartesian principle that a perfectly good being never deceives.
While I do not (as, of course, Descartes did not) endorse what I consider to be
the indefensible claim that there could never occur cases of epistemic deception
that a perfectly good being would fail to prevent-indeed, given that God exists,
there are uncountably many such cases-that there can occur nonveridical
spiritual-union experience that was God-produced-and-God-conserved entails
something far more pernicious than a perfectly good being's acquiescence in a
case of epistemic deception, i.e., it entails that there could occur cases of epistemic
deception that were brought about by God. However, it seems to me that the
coup de grace has to be this: that there could occur nonveridical spiritual-union
experience that was God-produced-and-God-conserved entails that God could be
the productive and conserving cause of epistemic deception concerning not simply
'experience of His presence' as such, but experience of His presence that constitutes religious experience of the most spiritually profound sort. Surely, if it is
not transparent that such a state of affairs is precluded by the concept of a
maximally good being, I cannot begin to understand how any intelligible content
can be assigned to that concept. Accordingly, it is eminently proper to conclude
that no nonveridical spiritual-union experience could fail to be among those
experiences or phenomenological modes of persons that lacked the property of
being God-produced-and-God-conserved.
To finalize, then, I believe we have secured our thesis that any spiritual-union
experience with the property of being veridical would, ipso facto, have the
property of being veridical essentially, i.e., the property of being such that no
illusive spiritual··union experience could be a perfect phenomenological imitation
of that veridical spiritual-union experience. Hence, since we have seen there to
be powerful warrant for holding that any experience to which veridicality was
essential would be an experience that was self-authenticating, there is precisely
such warrant for holding that the occurrence of self-authenticating religious
experience constitutes a conceivable state of affairs solely on the condition that
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the occurrence of veridical spiritual-union experience constitutes a conceivable
state of affairs. Clearly, however-and notwithstanding the full range of disagreement concerning just how to unpack the attribute of omnipotence-the power
to effect veridical spiritual-union experience could not be lacked by any being
worthy of the title God. Accordingly, whatever might be said of the epistemological claims of SF and the mystical tradition in general, there seems to be very
strong justification for rejecting as ill-founded the time-honored contention that
the notion of self-authenticating religious experience is conceptually unacceptable. 24
University of Missouri-Rolla

NOTES
1. Cf., for example, The Life oj Teresa oj Jesus, translated and edited, with an introduction, by
E. Allison Peers (New York: Image Books, 1958), p. 251; John Baillie, Our Knowledge oJ God
(London: Charles Scribner Sons, 1949), p. 132; and Thomas Merton, New Seeds oJ Contemplation
(New York: New Directions Books, 1961), p. 233. for variegated statements of the doctrine that
the most spiritually significant apprehensions of God's presence are such that they guarantee their
own veridicality to their epistemic subjects.
2. It seems to me that any attempt to provide a convincing rigorous definition of 'veridical' may
well be no less quixotic than attempts to provide convincing rigorous definitions of so many other
key concepts introduced into philosophical discussion. This notwithstanding, however, I suggest
that our grasp of what it takes for an experience to be veridical is no more obscure than our grasp
of what it takes for a proposition to be true (i.e., not really obscure at all). For some elaboration of
this point, see my 'Religious Experience, Self· Authentication, and Modality De Re: A Prolegomenon' ,
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1979), pp. 217-24.

3. It should be clear that 'experience' is used here-and in the sequel-in the 'referential' or
extrapsychological sense, i.e., the sense in which 'N is having a veridical experience of 0' entails
that the existence of 0 is in no way a function of N's experience of it. Accordingly, we are not
using 'experience' in the sense in which one often is said to experience her pains, her regrets, her
after·images, her disappointments, etc.
4. I shall often use 'mystic(s)' as a shorthand for 'theistic mystic(s)', i.e., for any theist who
eschews the technique of discursive proof in favor of the view that knowledge/certainty concerning
the reality and will of God is to be had by 'direct experience' of God/God's presence, and, in
addition, claims to have had precisely such experience.
S. Op. cit.

6. The one presupposition of this argument is that God's existence gives compelling indication of
being a perfectly conceivable state of affairs. It seems to me that, given the notorious unsuccess of
'ontological disproofs' of God's existence-indeed, so far as I know, there is no rationally persuasive
argument for the conceptual falsity of God exists in the literature of philosophical theology-this
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presupposition is entirely appropriate.
7. Unfortunately, a great deal of confusion has grown up around this point, i.e., it has often been
held that the occurrence of self-authenticating religious experience is impossible because the occurrence of illusive religious experience is possible. For an attempt to establish the misguided character
of any such argument, see my 'Religious Experience and Rational Certainty', Religious Studies Vol.
12 (1976), pp. 311-18.
8. Since the property of veridicality is accidental to any sense-experience that exemplifies it, then
it must be accidental to any sense-experience that exemplifies it. Alternatively, given the incontestable
modal principle that whatever is conceivable (or logically possible) is necessarily conceivable, since
it is conceivable for all veridical sense-experience to be nonveridical, it is (ipso facto) necessarily
conceivable for all veridical sense-experience to be nonveridical. Accordingly, no veridical senseexperience could have been such that its veridicality was essential to it-i.e., the property of
veridicality must be accidental to any sense-experience exemplifying it.

9. This question, of course, assumes that experiences which qualify as religious in character are
(ipso facto) nonsensory in character, or that experiences which are candidates for being veridical
apprehensions of God's presence do not involve the external senses. Such a doctrine is absolutely
central to theistic mysticism. One need only note Saint Teresa's disdain for 'visions which are seen
with the eyes of the body' (op. cit., p. 260) and the low esteem in which Saint John of the Cross
held all 'apprehensions ... which are communicated through sense ... ' (Ascent of Mount Carmel,
translated and edited, with a general introduction, by E. Allison Peers. (New York: Image Books,
1958), p. 260. (Italics mine)). For an argument that raises some questions about the traditional
bifurcation between sensory experience and religious experience, see my 'Religious Experience,
Sense-Perception, and God's Essential Unobservability', Religious Studies, Vol. 17 (1981), pp.
357-67.

10. See Michael Levine's valuable paper 'Can There be Self-Authenticating Experiences of God?',
Religious Studies, Vol. 19 (1983), pp. 229-34 and my reply in the same (June) issue, pp. 235-39.
11. Cf. George Mavrodes, Belief in God (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 53. This point,
which is of major significance to our thesis, is developed and documented in significant detail in
the final section of this paper.
12. Surely, we have learned at least this much from distinguished epistemologists of the 'immediate'
such as C. 1. Lewis.
13. As pointed out, of course, by so many commentators of mysticism. Cf., for example, William
James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modem Library, 1902 and 1929),
p. 371.
14. While the doctrine that contingent objects could not continue-in-existence without God's conserving activity any more than they could begin to exist without God's productive activity is absolutely
integral to traditional theistic metaphysics, it seems to me that it may well have an entailment from
which many traditional theists would recoil. See my 'Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?',
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1983), pp. 105-12.
15. Thomas Merton, The Ascent to Truth (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1951 and
1979), p. 70.
16. One might consult, for example, Saint John of the Cross (op. cit.), pp. 177-84, esp. pp. 179-80,
Saint Teresa (op_ cit.), pp. 173-219, and William James (op. cit.), p. 372.
17. The 'illumination' metaphor is, of course, used very widely among theistic mystics. See Saint
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John of the Cross (op. cit.), p. 181, and Abraham Isaac Kook, The Lights of Penitence. The Moral
Principles. Lights of Holiness. Essays. Letters. and Poems, translation and introduction by Ben Zion
Bokser (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 221. Kook contends there that all things endeavor 'to
conform to the inflow of the light of the En Sof'.
18. The Ascent to Truth, p. 70. Incidentally, Fr. Merton has some intriguing things to say about
the phenomenological content of mystical union-i.e., about the phenomenology of 'loss of self':
see p. 284 of New Seeds of Contemplation. What Merton has to say there is remarkably similar to
what is maintained by Saint John of the Cross on p. 182 (op. cit.).
19. The Ascent to Truth, p. 75 (Merton's italics).

20. Perhaps, however, this principle is not obviously as unproblematic as I take it to be. I shall deal
very soon with a plausible objection to it.
21. I thank the editor of this journal for calling it to my attention.
22. I use 'decisional' here primarily in the broad or 'extensional' sense. That is, in choosing to
perform some action, we do not usually choose (or intend) to have all of the experiences implied
by that action (indeed, we rarely know what they are). For example, in choosing to go on an African
safari, I do not thereby choose to confront a leopard, but such an experience may well be one result
of my choosing to go on an African safari. In just this sense, many of our experiences are functions
of our decisions.
23. There could, of course, occur nonveridical spiritual-union experiences which are to be explained
in precisely this way, i.e., as a result of some drug ingested by its epistemic subject.
24. I thank the editor of Faith and Philosophy and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions
that led to (what I hope are) major improvements in this paper.

